Services providing end-to-end encryption claim it is the best way to protect digital information. Messaging apps like Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram use this feature as a marketing tactic. They give assurance that no one but the participants of the conversation can access it. Still, even though encryption safeguards your texts, it does not protect you from the platforms’ more complicated and sordid realities. In the skirmish of privacy, control, or censorship, encryption only addresses part of the issue. In many cases, it can distract from far more important matters.
The mirage of security
Encryption offers an illusion of security. It feeds the notion that even governments, advertisers, or the platform would not be privy to the conversations. In many technical ways, that’s true. However, metadata—who you talk to, when, and for how long—is rarely protected. Most platforms still collect and store this data. In authoritarian regimes, metadata alone can be enough to build a case against dissidents, activists, or journalists. Encryption doesn’t hide your digital footprint; it only masks the contents of the message.
Take WhatsApp, for example, while its messages are end-to-end encrypted, the app is owned by Meta. The company has a long history of surveilling adjacent business practices. The platform shares user metadata with its parent company for advertising and analytics. That data can also be handed over to governments on request. The result is a system where your messages may be unreadable, but your behavior remains exposed.
Power behind the platforms
Most political stances on messaging apps lack neutrality. Signal often gets praised as the most privacy-concerned app. It is operated by a nonprofit and fights off attempts to scale back its encryption. Still, it works under U.S. laws and uses centralized systems. While Telegram is renowned for the public channels and relatively low censorship, it does not apply end-to-end encryption to group chats or public debates by default. Its founder, Pavel Durov, markets the app as a freedom instrument, yet Telegram has also honored takedown demands in some jurisdictions to remain usable.
These decisions reflect a quiet calculus. Platforms must balance their commitment to privacy with their need to remain operational across different jurisdictions. That often means compromising on principles to avoid bans or legal action. For users, it creates a false sense of security. Just because a service markets itself as private doesn’t mean it can resist state pressure.
Censorship as compliance
Encryption can’t stop a platform from censoring or suppressing content. In fact, governments increasingly rely on companies to moderate speech on their behalf. India, for instance, has demanded that messaging apps remove “offensive” content or face restrictions. Telegram channels have been shut down for political reasons in Iran and Belarus. Even in democracies, governments use legal tools to force platforms into censorship agreements. Encryption doesn’t protect users from these broader policy choices—it only limits what can be read directly.
Moreover, the focus on encryption can obscure a platform’s willingness to cooperate with governments. A secure messaging app might still comply with takedown orders, block users, or restrict content to maintain its market share. Users may never even be notified that content has been removed or that someone has been banned. In these cases, encryption offers little defense against structural censorship.
Beyond encryption
The promise of encrypted messaging is seductive: a space where no one can snoop. But true chat safety is not just math. It needs good laws, open rules, and transparency. Who owns the app, where is its HQ, and how it responds to power will shape how safe it is. Without legal protections and a clear ethical stance, encryption becomes a half-measure—useful, but insufficient.
To make sure our chats are safe, we must look past just the code or encryption. We must ask harder questions about the structures behind the apps we use every day. Who runs them? Who funds them? Can we see the rules? A locked room is not much if your neighbour holds a spare key to the room.
